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The IGPA’s Budget Policy Toolbox contains analyses of 
the Illinois income tax, sales tax, and other standard 
sources of revenue. Here is a different idea. Since taxing 
anything decreases the incentive to participate in that 
activity, and since Illinois may need to tax something to 
generate state revenue, then perhaps the state could tax 
“bad” economic activity like polluting emissions instead 
of “good” economic activity, like labor earnings and 
investment.
A tax on polluting emissions could help the state 
generate revenue while reducing acid rain, ozone 
formation, and consequent health problems in Illinois. 
Some pollutants are currently controlled by permit 
trading programs that do not raise any revenue. 
Here, we discuss a revenue-generating permit trading 
program for carbon dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas 
(GHG) that contributes to climate change.1
This “cap-and-trade” program has the potential to raise 
significant revenue because almost half of electricity 
generated in Illinois is from coal-fired power plants 
1This paper draws on Fullerton, Don and Karney, Daniel H., 
(2014). Cap-and-trade for Illinois? The llinois Report 2014. You can 
also see that paper for more background on California’s AB-32 
and more detail on calculations for Illinois.
(See Figure 1). We calculate that permit auctions could 
raise $1 billion to $4 billion per year, with a reasonable 
estimate of $2 billion in the initial years. Figure 2 
shows that this $2 billion would balance the budget in 
FY2015, and fill almost half of the projected deficits for 
fiscal years 2016-2018. This program could also reduce 
the level of CO2 being emitted, thus contributing to 
climate change relief.
We use California’s cap-and-trade program (called 
AB-32) as a model that Illinois could follow. We 
describe that program, calculate revenue for Illinois, 
and discuss economic and distributional effects. While 
the electricity generating companies would pay the 
state for the carbon emissions, our analysis shows that 
the true economic burden for such a program would 
likely be shifted through higher prices, lower wages, 
or lower rates of return. Conventional wisdom holds 
that most of the economic burden of such a program 
falls on electric utility customers and on workers in 
industries covered by the cap. In contrast, we show that 
most of the economic incidence of an Illinois cap-and-
trade policy would fall on out-of-state stockholders 
of publicly traded electric utilities. Therefore, under 
a cap-and-trade policy such as the one described 
below, Illinois citizens could benefit with higher state 
revenue, while people and businesses outside the 
state would bear most of the cost through effects on 
their corporate stock prices.
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How cap-and-trade works—California’s AB-32
The goal of California’s law AB-32 is to return the state 
to 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. This 
program has two basic elements. The “cap” sets a limit 
on total GHG emissions statewide. The “trade” part 
of the program allows buying and selling of permits, 
where the fixed number of permits enforces the cap. 
Legislative rules specify which emission sources are 
covered by the cap. AB-32’s cap covers all fixed-point 
smokestack sources that emit more than 25,000 metric 
tons of CO2 (MTCO2) annually. The California law 
covers approximately 600 of these sources, such as 
electric utility power plants. 
California uses the 25,000 MTCO2 per year threshold 
because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) already requires fixed-point sources above that 
threshold to report their emissions under the GHG 
Reporting Program. According to 2011 EPA data, 
Illinois has 216 fixed-point, industrial plants that emit 
more than 25,000 MTCO2, and the majority of these 
emissions are from electric utilities’ power plants. In 
addition, if Illinois follows the AB-32 model, then the 
cap would cover transportation fuel used in mobile 
emission sources such as trucks and cars. Since the cost 
of technology to measure emissions from millions of 
mobile sources is prohibitive, the cap instead applies 
to transportation fuel directly at the distributor level. 
In order to enforce the cap, the state issues “permits,” 
each of which allows the bearer to emit one metric ton 
of CO2. In the first year of a cap-and-trade program, 
the cap can be set just below the projected business-
as-usual emission level in the absence of the program. 
The cap then tightens over time, decreasing overall 
emissions. 
Supply and demand determine the trading market 
price of a permit. The supply of available permits 
rises when businesses can forgo emitting CO2 or 
other GHGs because they’ve taken steps to reduce 
emissions. Abatement methods could include: (1) 
capital improvements that increase fuel efficiency, (2) 
switching from high-carbon to low-carbon fuels, and 
(3) carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, such 
as the FutureGen project here in Illinois. 
The demand for permits comes from the desire to 
emit GHGs in the production of goods or services, like 
electricity. Thus, the market price of a permit is the 
value of emitting one unit of CO2, which in equilibrium 
is expected to reflect the cost of abating one unit of 
CO2. The market mechanism encourages businesses to 
undertake low-cost abatement opportunities in order 
to sell excess permits. It also means that producers of 
high-value commodities and services can continue to 
operate, even if abatement is costly. 
A carbon tax is another mechanism that can be used 
to reduce GHG emissions and to raise revenue. With 
no uncertainty about either the supply or the demand 
for permits, a carbon tax and cap-and-trade program 
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Figure 2: State of Illinois Five-Year Projections: 
General Funds Operating Surplus (Deficit) with and 










Notes: State of Illinois five-year budget projections 
from IIFS (2013). Potential cap-and-trade revenue 
based on $10 per metric ton CO2 permit price for all 
fixed-point sources with emissions larger than 25,000 
metric tons CO2 annually and transportation fuels, 
totaling $2.0 billion annually (starting 2015). 
Notes: Calculations include generation from 























Figure 1: Percent Electricity Generation by Fuel 
Type in Illinois by Year
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however, a cap-and-trade program has the advantage 
of setting an upper-bound on total amount of GHG 
emissions. Thus, when the cap is tightened over time, 
a cap-and-trade program guarantees a reduction in 
total GHG emissions. Alternatively, command-and-
control (CAC) regimes can also reduce GHG emissions, 
simply by requiring how abatement must be achieved 
by each plant. These CAC policies do not use market 
incentives and so can be inefficient, leading to a higher 
social cost per unit of GHG reduction. And they do 
not raise revenue.
Possible revenue for Illinois
To get started, the state must choose an initial allocation 
of permits. Even for cap-and-trade, governments 
often choose to “grandfather” businesses in covered 
industries, handing out valuable permits for free 
(based on past GHG emissions and prorated so that 
the total number of permits matches the cap). This 
method generates no revenue. Instead, polluting 
businesses effectively receive a lump-sum payment 
for past GHG emissions. 
Alternatively, the state could sell the permits at 
an auction, raising revenue to bolster the state’s 
treasury. California’s AB-32 currently uses a mix of 
grandfathering and auction methods, but over time it 
will shift mainly to auctioned permits. In the first year 
alone, California has raised more than $500 million 
from permit auctions, with a price slightly above $10 
per MTCO2. Although the two methods have different 
initial permit allocations, permit trading can lead to 
identical production and abatement outcomes. The 
difference comes down to whether the state raises 
revenue with an auction or businesses are given 
valuable permits for free.
How much revenue could a cap-and-trade program 
raise? Assuming that an Illinois program would be 
similar to AB-32 but auction all the permits, we expect 
such a program to generate approximately $2 billion 
annually in the initial years. AB-32 requires a 2 percent 
annual emissions reduction in the initial years, and the 
permit auctions for those years cleared about $10 per 
permit. We therefore assume that Illinois also could 
achieve 1 percent emissions reduction for each $5 
increment in the permit price: That is, a $10 per metric 
ton price could yield a 2 percent reduction, while a 
$20 per metric ton price could result in a 4 percent 
reduction in GHG emissions. Then the total revenue is 
calculated by multiplying the permit price by the total 
emissions permissible under the cap. 
Table 1 presents three different initial-year estimates 
of revenue. First, note that the 216 industrial plants 
in Illinois with annual emissions greater than 25,000 
MTCO2 emit about 140 million MTCO2 in total per 
year.1 In the first row of Table 1, we apply a 1 percent 
reduction to these fixed-point emissions and multiply 
by $5 per permit, yielding an estimated $693 million 
of revenue. Transportation in Illinois emits about 67 
million MTCO2 annually.2 We apply the 1 percent 
reduction to these mobile-source emissions and 
multiply by $5 per metric ton to calculate additional 
revenue is $331 million. The estimated total is $1.02 
billion, but actual outcomes depend on many factors, 
including the percentage of permits auctioned, the 
tightness of the cap, and economic growth in covered 
industries. 
The second row of Table 1 presents the case similar 
to California with a $10 permit price and a 2 percent 
reduction in emissions. For Illinois, revenue then is 
estimated to be $2 billion per year. A $20 permit price 
1Data retrieved from www.ghgdata.epa.gov (September 2013).
2Data retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/
state/state_emissions.cfm (September 2013).
Table 1: Initial Year Estimates of Revenue from a Cap-and-Trade Program in
Illinois under Full Permit Auctioning (2013 dollars)













1 5 1.0 0.69 0.33 1.02
2 10 2.0 1.37 0.66 2.03
3 20 4.0 2.69 1.29 3.97
Notes: All figures are subject to independent rounding. Assumptions: (a) Baseline fixed-point source 
emissions are 140 million MTCO2; (b) Baseline mobile-source emissions are 67 million MTCO2; (c) 
Emission reduction percentages are directly proportional to the permit price, where each $5 of permit 
price results in a 1.0 percent emission reduction.
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with a 4 percent emissions reduction would yield 
almost $4 billion. 
If a cap-and-trade program continues long term, then 
real revenue after accounting for inflation can rise or 
fall depending on (1) changes in the economy toward 
low-carbon industries, (2) interactions with other 
federal or state programs to reduce GHG emissions, 
and (3) technological change – whether or not induced 
by the cap-and-trade. 
Economic incidence and distributional effects
A cap-and-trade program like the one in California 
puts the statutory burden on producers that emit 
greenhouse gases and on distributors of transportation 
fuels. A coal-fired power plant’s operator must 
purchase a permit for each metric ton of CO2 that the 
plant releases. Because of changes in behavior and 
changes in prices, however, others could bear the 
economic burden – through higher prices of carbon-
intensive products like electricity, changes in the wage 
rate at covered industries, and capitalization of higher 
costs of production into stock prices. 
First, much of the higher production cost might be 
passed to consumers through higher electricity prices. 
Since low-income families spend a large portion 
of income on necessities like electricity, a cap-and-
trade program that leads to higher electricity prices 
could have a regressive burden. But contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, a cap-and-trade program 
in Illinois would probably not increase electricity 
rates significantly. Wholesale markets determine 
the electricity price for those customers, so those 
rates depend upon the cost of production at the last 
power plant that comes online. In Illinois, the carbon-
intensive coal-fired power plants are used earlier in 
the dispatch order. Instead, the relatively low-carbon 
natural gas plants are the last ones to come online and 
effectively set the price. Per unit of electricity, natural 
gas-fired power plants are approximately 60 percent 
less carbon-intensive than coal-fired power plants. 
So a cap-and-trade program leads to a relatively 
small cost increase at natural gas plants that set the 
electricity price. 
If natural gas plants effectively set the price, just 
breaking even, then the market price of electricity 
may be too low to cover the higher cost of producing 
electricity in carbon-intensive coal-fired plants. 
Seventeen of the 20 coal-fired power plants in Illinois 
with annual emissions above the 25,000 MTCO2 
threshold are owned by publicly-traded companies. 
Furthermore, these 17 plants account for 62 percent 
of annual fixed-point emissions from sources above 
the reporting threshold in Illinois. As a consequence, 
the nationwide stockholders of those firms may take 
a loss. 
Another potential distributional effect could be on the 
wages and job security of workers at electric utilities 
and coal mines. But the economic burden via this path 
also is probably smaller than generally thought. Power 
plants are long-term investments that are difficult to 
replace in the short-run. A cap-and-trade program 
might encourage a somewhat earlier retirement of 
coal-fired power plants, to be replaced by gas-fired 
power plants, and workers can gradually move from 
old to new generation facilities. For coal miners, the 
effects will be small because coal will still be demanded 
by power plants in Illinois as well as by other states 
without GHG limits. However, Illinois could use some 
of the permit revenue to create a retraining program 
for displaced miners if that specific industry is hit 
hard by the cap-and-trade program. 
If higher production costs cannot be passed on to 
consumers via higher electricity prices or to workers 
via lower wages, then the result is reduced profits. 
Reduced profitability lowers the value of a business 
and the stock price of publicly traded companies. 
Large companies have many stockholders around 
the world, and they may have well-paid lobbyists 
operating in Illinois, but only a small fraction of their 
owners live in Illinois. In terms of magnitude, for a $10 
permit price, the publicly traded company that owns 
the greatest share of coal-fired power plants in Illinois 
would incur a 2.5 percent burden relative to annual 
revenue. 
An option to consider
A reasonable cap-and-trade program to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in Illinois could significantly 
reduce future deficits. Under a program similar to 
California’s AB-32, a full auction of permits could 
raise $2 billion annually. Most of the economic burden 
would fall on stockholders, most of whom live outside 
Illinois. In addition, Illinois businesses could gain 
experience operating in a GHG-limited environment 
ahead of possible future federal limits. Illinois 
researchers could invent patentable technologies that 
other states and countries would want in their later 
efforts to reduce GHGs. 
Just like any hike in the Illinois income tax or sales tax, 
some of the burden of a cap-and-trade program will 
be felt inside Illinois. The actual outcomes cannot be 
guaranteed. Some of those burdens may be a high 
5
fraction of income for those with low incomes. Yet a 
cap-and-trade to raise revenue for Illinois might place 
a high percentage of its burden on those living outside 
of Illinois, and some of the revenue can be used to 
offset burdens on low-income families in Illinois.• 
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